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1  Five Key Ingredients of Neighbourhood-Level 
Boundary-Making 
 In our boundary-making perspective, ethnicity (regarded as the result of actors’ 
interactions and defi nitions) is just one among several possible lenses used to appre-
hend social situations, alongside others such as profession, class, and place of resi-
dence (Taboada Leonetti  1989 ; Lamont  2009 ; Lamont and Small  2008 ). Informed 
by this assumption, we have looked not only at migration-generated ethnic cleav-
ages but also at other divisions emerging in the empirical fi eldwork. Consistently 
with what has also been suggested by theorists of ‘super-diversity’ (Vertovec  2006 ), 
we have focused particularly on the way in which these different divisions interact 
with those generated by migration in structuring groups, considering how and to 
what extent they overlap, and whether they weaken or reinforce each other. 
 Before analyzing the boundaries found through our fi eldwork, it is worth remem-
bering that they by no means have the same signifi cance and relevance everywhere. 
First of all, the signifi cance of the various boundaries and their salience in structuring 
mobilization and confl icts varies across countries (Lamont  2009 ; Lamont and Small 
 2008 ). Also within countries, and indeed within the same city, it emerges clearly 
how boundaries have different relevance in different situations making it a matter of 
empirical analysis to determine how these boundaries concretely work in specifi c 
circumstances (Wimmer  2008 ). This is precisely what we have attempted in 
analyzing and comparing the role of recent, and less recent, migration fl ows in 
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 shaping, shifting or blurring boundaries among groups in the eleven European 
neighbourhoods analyzed in previous chapters. 
 According to our fi ndings , ethnicity remains one of the most relevant inter-group 
cleavages. However, this is experienced differently in different contexts, depending 
on nationally and locally specifi c histories. The majority and minorities can indeed 
have very different profi les which, even at neighbourhood level, are strongly 
 infl uenced by national, regional or city-level cognitive frames and rhetoric. In more 
recent immigration countries (Italy, Spain), the cleavage is predominantly under-
stood as being between a ‘native’ majority and one or several ‘migrant’ minorities. 
In older immigration countries (UK, Germany), ethnic minorities are less closely 
associated with migration: in British neighbourhoods, for instance, ‘black’ is 
 altogether a well-established marker of identity and in German neighbourhoods 
 former Soviet Union citizens who mostly have German origins and German 
nationality are nevertheless perceived as a minority group. In countries still in an 
embryonic phase of the immigration cycle, such as Hungary, immigration is not 
really an issue and the main cleavage is between an ethnic majority and historic 
 national minorities (e.g. Roma) rather than migrants as such. From this point of 
view, the eccentricity of Budapest neighbourhoods in our gallery of case studies 
confi rms the persisting specifi city in the framing of international immigration in 
Eastern Europe as opposed to both established western and northern European 
destinations, and to more recent southern European receiving countries (Okólski 
 2012 ; Tryandafi llidou and Gropas  2014 ). 
 Within these macro and well-known frames, we identifi ed fi ner cleavages by 
looking ethnographically at inter-group relations in everyday experience and in 
 specifi c places. One of the most evident results is that  the visibility of a certain group 
infl uences the criteria of its identifi cation: the more visible a group is, the more 
precise are the criteria of its identifi cation. For instance, the most visible groups are 
often identifi ed with countries of origin whereas smaller groups are identifi ed with 
broader geographical areas. South Americans, for instance, are not distinguished by 
country of origin in most neighbourhoods, except for some Barcelona areas and for 
San Paolo in Turin, where they are numerous. Chinese, who represent a sizeable 
minority almost everywhere, are addressed as such. In Budapest’s neighbourhoods, 
however, where the presence of foreigners is still low, people are less likely to 
 distinguish groups by country of origin and they usually use ‘Asians’ and ‘Chinese’ 
interchangeably to refer to all migrants from the Asian continent including for 
instance Vietnamese. Visibility, however, does not depend only on the group’s size 
but also on its presence in public places. For instance, in Sagrada Família the  number 
of registered Pakistani residents is very low (0.2 % of total population) but they are 
well recognized due to the presence of several Pakistani grocery stores. Also 
Romanians, who account for only 0.4 % of neighbourhood residents, are identifi ed 
as such by residents due to their visibility, often associated with negative stigmas 
(begging, pick-pocketing tourists). 
 While the cleavage between ethnic majority and minorities remains central , age, 
length of stay and socio-economic conditions have also emerged as being specifi -
cally relevant in most of our target neighbourhoods.  Intergenerational cleavages , in 
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particular, have been registered across several case studies: elderly people  frequently 
portray both majority and minority young generations as less willing to take care of 
public places or actively engage in the neighbourhood’s civic life. For instance, in 
many Sagrada Família associations, like the Residents’ Association, the majority of 
day-to-day active participants are elderly or mature people who blame young people 
for not actively participating in local civic life. In Barriera di Milano, several elderly 
residents lament the communication diffi culties with the new  generations, for, 
among other reasons, the decline in the transfer of handicraft know- how and skills 
that were once important neighbourhood assets. In Bermondsey the majority of the 
White British population is made up of elderly residents who often perceive them-
selves in opposition to a younger population of immigrants and ethnic minorities, 
often with children, who have arrived in recent years and do not share their memory 
and ideal of estates as social places. Similarly, in the German neighbourhood of 
Werderau long-established elderly residents accuse the youth, mainly of Turkish 
origin, of not sticking to the ‘old order’, for instance by not keeping the neighbour-
hood clean, making noise and adopting other ‘uncivil’ behaviours. In both cases, 
elderly people paradoxically stand out as among the least integrated groups since 
they do not feel at home in their own changing neighbourhood and are strongly and 
nostalgically linked to a mythical past now disappeared. 
 Their feeling of distance from younger residents is largely independent from 
ethnicity, but where they overlap, ethnic and generational cleavages can indeed be 
mutually reinforcing. As for ethnic boundaries among youngsters, they are usually 
more blurred, with some notable exceptions. Inter-group tensions can be intensifi ed 
by mediatization of origin-based groupings, as in the cases of ‘Latin American 
gangs’ in Sagrada Família and Poble Sec or ‘black gangs’ in Camberwell. Yet, local 
belonging and specifi c notions of territoriality seem to be very important in shaping 
and structuring these youth groups, often more than ethnic origin or belonging. 1 
 Socio-economic conditions are certainly another crucial factor in structuring 
cleavages, but they may operate in very different and sometimes counter-intuitive 
ways. For instance, in Barcelona’s Sagrada Família, economic diffi culties shared by 
natives and immigrants living in the area called Encants Vells seem to foster recip-
rocal understanding so that immigrants there generally do not seem to be stigma-
tized. This goes against easy and widespread prophecies that the economic crisis, 
which was getting more acute during our fi eldwork, would necessarily fuel intereth-
nic tensions starting from the most severely hit local contexts, such as some of our 
southern European target neighbourhoods. In the fi nal part of this chapter we will 
come back to some possible explanations for this crucial and puzzling question, 
which is, however, certainly deserving of continued monitoring and additional 
research. 
 In Bermondsey, in the former docklands area occupied by the Jacob’s Island 
development, a key issue is the juxtaposition of the affl uent gated communities and 
1  It is worth noting that Body-Gendrot ( 2002 ) has found the same attachment to local territories 
among young people in French banlieues: religious and ethnic differences are perceived as second-
ary to belonging to the collective space of the neighbourhood. 
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the relatively deprived housing estates nearby. This divide is generated by economic 
disparities but also by the deeply rooted stigma concerning council housing. So 
while they live in immediate proximity, there is altogether very limited common 
ground – in terms of shared spaces and interests – between these two communities 
in this part of Bermondsey. Finally, in our comparative fi eldwork, we also identifi ed 
cases of immigrants living in a gated community. In Kőbánya the wealthiest group 
is made up of Asians rather than Hungarians. Thus, it is primarily more affl uent 
people of Asian origin who live in a residential compound like Taraliget, which is 
enclosed by a high fence. 
 Religion is another relevant criterion of identifi cation and grouping, although it 
appears less crucial at the local level than it has become, especially with regard to 
Islam, in national-level political and public discourses in Europe during the last two 
decades. In Werderau, despite the relevant presence of Turkish immigrants, religion 
was not regarded as a cleavage in the past and it only became a marker of identity 
when confl icts arose between old residents and new Turkish residents. The tensions 
seem to be mainly related to control over the housing stock but have been framed as 
ethnic and even religious cleavages. Due to these housing tensions that crosscut the 
Turkish minority itself, intra-community religious tensions also emerged between, 
on the one hand, old-established residents with a Turkish background who interpret 
Islam in a more open manner, and newly-arrived residents who follow stricter and 
more traditional rules of religious behaviour (headscarf, regular mosque attendance 
etc.), on the other hand. The role of religion as a marker of identity was also empha-
sized by residents in both of the London neighbourhoods that were studied. While 
some of the White British volunteers and community activists working locally in 
Bermondsey referred to their Christian belief as a major motivating factor, in 
Camberwell affi liation to West African churches was seen as an important and 
structuring aspect of everyday life and social organization, particularly by Black 
African respondents. 
 In southern European neighbourhoods, religion and nationality often overlap, 
and are usually evoked in a confl ated and confused manner. In Barriera di Milano, 
natives often create confusion when they assign people to various categories: 
 religious identity (being a Muslim) is used interchangeably with national belonging 
(being a Moroccan) and language (being Arabic-speaking). In Sagrada Família, the 
term ‘Muslims’ constitutes a group label applied by interviewees in an encompass-
ing way to cover both Pakistanis and Moroccans. 
 Finally, the  length of stay can separate or unite residents across geographical 
and/or ethnic lines. In Werderau established residents, of both native and Turkish 
background, tend to disagree with the lifestyle of new inhabitants of Turkish origin. 
In Italian neighbourhoods, differences emerge within larger and long-established 
minorities. In San Paolo, native residents frequently state that the earlier Moroccan 
immigrants were more inclined to incivilities and even crime whereas Moroccan 
newcomers are considered to be individuals who strive to legalize their situation and 
be fully included in the host community. In contrast, in Barriera di Milano, the 
Moroccans who arrived at the end of the 1970s are depicted by natives as honest and 
hardworking, while recently arrived Moroccans are portrayed as menacing, immoral 
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and unscrupulous. This difference between the two Italian neighbourhoods is 
 probably due to the fact that San Paolo has become a sort of second-step destination 
for settled families whereas Barriera di Milano has increasingly become a fi rst des-
tination for newcomers regarded as less integrated than long-established migrants 
who are rather assimilated and have started families there. 
 Usually, even immigrants classify themselves according to the period of their 
arrival in the neighbourhood. In Barriera di Milano the early-comers depict 
 themselves as being more open to interactions and less problematic, differentiating 
themselves from latecomers to whom they attribute behaviours more disturbing for 
the established social order. A meaningful example is found in the Senegalese 
 community: those who migrated in the fi rst wave emphasize their work ethic and 
their rigid compliance with the religious norms of the Mourid Brotherhood (Carter 
 1997 ), to which they all belong, and they complain that such good habits have been 
abandoned by their young fellow countrymen, some of whom are involved in 
drug-pushing. 
 Similarly, in British neighbourhoods, the term ‘black’ refers to a number of 
 ethnic and national categories – Black Caribbeans, West Africans, Somalis – 
 characterized by signifi cant divides as well as occasional tensions. These distinc-
tions based on origin usually overlap with those based on length of stay. The Black 
African population in Camberwell has been growing rapidly since the 1980s. By 
2001 it was approximately twice the size of the Black Caribbean population which, 
dating back to the Windrush generation of the 1950s, historically constituted the 
dominant minority in the neighbourhood. Whereas some of the West Indians have 
adopted religious and/or cultural practices connecting them to an ideal African heri-
tage – such as converting to Rastafarianism, collecting and displaying African arte-
facts, or wearing West African garments – there is also a history of tensions between 
them and West Africans, with some of the latter claiming that ‘they say we sold 
them’. Another component, and the most signifi cant one among recent black immi-
grants, is that of the Somalis, most of whom arrived in the late 1990s and 2000s. 
Somali respondents have described feeling othered, and at times stigmatized, by 
other black residents on account of their religion and immigrant status. We can then 
see that, especially in old migration countries such as Britain, the very concept of 
‘majority’ is a slippery and unstable construction which cannot be equated to white-
ness, and also that within minorities we constantly fi nd ongoing negotiations of 
racial and cultural sameness and difference (Ray et al.  2008 ). Therefore, we can say 
that  groups are never homogeneous and are rarely perceived as such, especially by 
their own members . 
 These boundaries have different signifi cance not only between neighbourhoods, 
but also within the same neighbourhood, between ‘sites of interactions’ in concrete 
urban places and everyday experience. Here we just give some examples drawn 
from the previous chapters and fi nal city reports of the Concordia Discors project 
( www.concordiadiscors.eu ), with reference to specifi c interaction sites among those 
researched in-depth. In order to go beyond an anecdotal description of concrete 
cases, we have sketched a typology of relations based on the distinction, explained 
in the Introduction, between representations (what people have in mind) and 
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 behaviours and actual relations (what people actually do) (Table  1 ). More precisely, 
although aware of the over-simplifi cation, we consider three types of relations 
(cooperation, lack of contact, confl ict), and three types of representations (positive, 
neutral/indifferent, negative). A caveat, perhaps obvious, is that the schematic rep-
resentation provided below is static, whereas in reality circular dynamics are con-
stantly operating by which representations are shaped by social interactions, which 
in turn affect representations.
 The fi rst interesting point refl ected by the presented evidence is that the market 
seems to have the capacity to foster competition as well as cooperation and to pro-
duce unusual matches of representations and interactions. Collaboration develops 
even between groups with reciprocal negative representations as a consequence of 
economic rationales. For example, Chinese traders in the Four Tigers Market in 
Józsefváros employ Roma people because they constitute cheap manpower even 
though they complain about their attitude towards work. On the other hand, groups 
who carry reciprocal positive representations may compete, as in the case of Arab 
shopkeepers who are regarded as fair competitors by their Hungarian peers, in spite 
of their sometimes ruthless practices, including, for instance, buying many shops 
solely to keep them closed and thus secure the area from commercial rivals. 
 Sometimes, relations developed in the labour market and in estates overlap, as in 
the case of elderly Hungarian baby-sitters hired by Chinese families in Taraliget 
Residential Park. Having very little time to look after their children due to their 
intensive work pace, Asian immigrants often hire retired Hungarian women to 
baby-sit their children. These women who also live in the neighbourhood often take 
care of their own grandchildren and of Chinese children at the same time. In this 
 Table 1  Patterns of inter – group relations and representations 
 Representations 
 Relations  Positive  Indifference  Negative 
 Cooperation  Different ethnic 
groups in the 








Residential Park in 
Kőbánya (HU) 
 Chinese traders and 
Roma employees in 
Four Tigers Market in 
Józsefváros (HU) 
 Lack of contact  Elderly people, 
teenagers and 
mothers with 
children in SPA 
garden in San 
Paolo (ITA) 
 Pakistanis and 
natives in Poble 
Sec (SPA) 
 Affl uent middle-class 
residents in redeveloped 
docklands and 
working-class residents 
on council estates, North 
Bermondsey (UK) 








 New Turkish residents 
and old German and 
Turkish residents in 
MAN’s housing stock in 
Werderau (GE) 
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case, children play a key role in creating more personal social relations between the 
two groups, as the economic dimension gradually loses importance and these 
women become almost like distant relatives. 
 This was the only example among the investigated Hungarian sites where small 
signs of cooperation are not matched with negative representations. One could 
hypothesize that such scarcity of cooperative interethnic behaviours in the case of 
Budapest neighbourhoods is related to the strongly xenophobic discourse propa-
gated in Hungarian politics by parties such as Jobbik. Such a hypothesis, however, 
has not been explicitly corroborated by local fi eldwork and would need supplemen-
tary targeted research to be formulated more precisely. 
 Among ‘outsiders’ migrants are not always the most evident or signifi cant 
 subjects or objects of neighbourhood confl icts. In Sagrada Família, for instance, the 
main concern of residents and the focus of their protests towards local authorities 
are city-users, i.e. the crowds of tourists fl ooding the neighbourhood and hampering 
its everyday life. 
 Finally, it is worth remembering that  actual relations are also contingent on time . 
This means that different groups may interact well during the day but not at night, 
as is often the case in public gardens or commercial areas. For instance, in Via di 
Nanni in San Paolo the open market offers an opportunity for amiable contact 
between majority (especially elderly) and minority residents during the morning 
whereas at night the emptied area becomes a car park and the few existing bars 
attract single migrant men who are regarded as disturbing and even dangerous by 
elderly people. 2 
 To conclude on this point, we can maintain that  different types of inter-group 
relations can be found not just in the same city but also within the same neighbour-
hood, according to site and time . Inter-group relations are not given, they are played 
out in concrete situations by the actors in the fi eld and are infl uenced by factors 
related to multiple levels: the nation, the city, the neighbourhood, the single site of 
interaction, the situation. 
2  The Role of Places in Boundary-Making 
and Inter-Group Relations 
 The concept of place in geography and urban sociology emphasizes the relations 
between subjective and objective perspectives since it encompasses both space and 
the experience that gives space an identity; in distinction to space, place also refers 
to memories, identities and relations (Abrahamson  1996 ; Soja and Hooper  1993 ; 
Greif and Cruiz  1997 ). We can then say that places are social constructions too, like 
group boundaries, and that both are objects of making-work. Furthermore, pro-
cesses of place-making and group-making are related. As Amin ( 2012 ) underlines, 
2  See  http://www.concordiadiscors.eu/assets/Turin-fi nal-report_integrated_12_10_2012-1.pdf 
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everyday encounters and interactions construct and, at the same time, are shaped by 
urban habitat, understood as the assembly of technologies, built environment and 
layout of public spaces, infrastructures and services, rules of order and symbolic 
culture. 
 In this perspective, public places – defi ned as ‘places accessible to the public’ – 
play a crucial role since they can be regarded as the main element from which 
 people derive their representations of cities and neighbourhoods (Tonnelat  2010 ; 
Lynch  1960 ). They are the places where urban representation and sociality are dis-
played and built at the same time (Amin  2012 ; Massey  2005 ). For these reasons, in 
our analysis we have given special attention to public places and most of the ‘sites 
of interaction’ where ethnographic work was carried out belong to this category. 
 The second assumption on which we based our analysis is that every place comes 
with its embedded set of principles of public organization and order, permissibility 
and possibilities, and terms of engagement between subjects (Amin  2012 ). Whereas 
public places are ‘the world in the streets where one meets strangers’, (Wessendorf 
 2010 , p. 22), ‘micropublics’, as defi ned by Amin ( 2002 ) are spaces of associations 
where habit of practice replaces mere co-presence, and dialogue and ‘prosaic nego-
tiations’ are compulsory; they are similar to what Wood and Landry ( 2007 ) defi ne 
as ‘zones of encounter’, i.e. places where deeper and more enduring interactions 
between people engaging in shared activities and common goals can take place, 
such as housing associations, parents’ groups, schools, workplaces, youth centres, 
sport clubs, etc. Therefore, despite the prevalent attention given to public places, in 
this research book we have tried to analyze inter-group relations also in ‘micropublics’ 
as well as in housing estates and apartment buildings, starting from the hypothesis 
that the different characteristics of these places foster the development of different 
kinds of relations (Wessendorf  2010 ). 
 Finally, in addition to being zones of encounters, places can simultaneously be 
stakes of confl ict. In particular, places can be viewed as stakes both in material and 
in symbolical terms since confl ict over them can hinge upon the feeling and ‘right 
to belong’, beliefs and values, social norms of behaviours and lifestyles. The con-
struction of ethnic categories is shaped by local struggles for material and symbolic 
resources (housing, jobs, public places) which sometimes take an ethnic form and 
may interplay with social divisions of gender, class and age (Ray et al.  2008 ; Esser 
 2002 ). Furthermore, when looking at urban places as stakes of confl ict, we have also 
to consider that the urban infrastructure and building environment impact processes 
in which resources and opportunities are allocated. Urban investment defi nes how 
much spaces, activities and people count and refl ect the decision to recognize and 
accommodate certain demands and claimants and disregard others (Amin  2012 ; 
Subiròs  2011 ). 
 As Wimmer ( 2013 ) underlines, it would make little sense to debate whether eth-
nicity is mostly about interests and material benefi ts or identities and immaterial 
goods since ethnic boundary-making intersects these different levels and mobilizes 
both sets of resources. For the sake of clarity, however, in the next sections we will 
analyze the two spheres separately. 
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2.1  Places as Material Stakes for (Ethnic) Confl ict 
 The nature of place as a stake of confl ict is evident when we consider  housing 
estates . Housing constitutes a key determinant for immigration settlement at the 
local level and it is one of the fundamental urban social goods over which confl ict 
can be staged. As studies have shown (Dench et al.  2006 ; Ray et al.  2008 ), alloca-
tion of social housing often becomes a key issue around which ethnic resentment 
may coalesce by distinguishing the deserving from the undeserving and thereby 
activating a sense of entitlement grounded in length of stay and sets of moral 
values. 
 This is particularly evident in neighbourhoods where access to housing stock 
suddenly changed, such as Bermondsey and Werderau. In post-World War 2 
Bermondsey, the vast majority of housing stock was social housing, primarily 
 controlled by the Bermondsey Metropolitan Borough. Under a principle informally 
known as ‘sons and daughters’, housing units would fi rst and foremost be made 
available to the offspring of tenants who already lived in the borough. The structural 
reform of 1965 that saw the metropolitan councils of Bermondsey, Southwark and 
Camberwell amalgamated into the London Borough of Southwark meant that the 
social housing stock in Bermondsey became available to residents from other parts 
of Southwark. Furthermore, the allocation of social housing became needs-based, 
conditional upon an assessment of personal circumstances rather than local family 
links. Thus from the early 1970s, immigrants and ethnic minorities increasingly 
gained access to social housing. At the same time, the social housing stock began to 
decline due to the introduction of the right to buy in 1980, while demand for the 
decreasing stock increased. Since new residents often belong to minorities, this 
 situation has raised confl icts which often run along ethnic lines or at least are framed 
in such a way by old residents belonging to the white working class. 
 A similar situation occurred in Werderau where most of the inhabitants worked 
for the nearby MAN factory and lived in housing stock owned by the same  company. 
With the arrival of wives and children of guest workers in the late 1960s and 1970s, 
sizeable numbers of these reunited families, mostly of Turkish origin, moved to 
Werderau and quickly integrated into the neighbourhood life centred on the factory. 
In 1998 MAN sold the housing stock to the real estate company Telos, which soon 
after went bankrupt (in 2001). This triggered a series of ownership changes among 
different investors and, as a result, new tenants and new house owners, mainly 
migrants of Turkish origin, moved into the neighbourhood. In contrast to past waves 
of local migration, in the new context of uncertainty this change has produced 
 divisions between old and new residents, with tensions growing between German 
and Turkish residents, as well as between old and new Turkish inhabitants. Although 
the origin of the confl ict seems clearly rooted in competition for control over hous-
ing stock, it has been framed by residents predominantly as an ethnic and cultural 
confl ict, given that the new residents are largely Turkish and perceived as having 
different norms of behaviour. As a matter of fact, this confl ict has partially been 
weakened by the intervention of the Municipality on the material set of  interests by 
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the acquisition of part of the housing stock by a city non-profi t housing company in 
order to partially restore the residents’ control and the pursuit of public well-being 
in the management. 
 Therefore confl icts over places are not necessarily framed as such and can turn 
into ethnic confl icts especially when length of stay and ethnic belonging overlap. 
When such ethnic and cultural tensions hide material confl icts, these can often be 
managed and partially overcome, as in Werderau, by changing the set of interests. 
2.2  Places as Symbolic Stakes: Ethnic Tensions in Post- 
Industrial Neighbourhoods 
 The kind of confl ict illustrated above between long-established mainly native 
working- class residents and newly settled ethnic minorities seems to depend not 
only on housing-related interests, but also on more general socio-economic trends. 
In fact, the ways in which groups position themselves and sometimes collide are 
also grounded in the everyday material realities of living in a declining urban 
neighbourhood. 
 In these neighbourhoods, narratives of longstanding residents refl ect material 
changes caused by economic decline and convey a sense of symbolic loss, embod-
ied in nostalgia for the allegedly cohesive community of the past. This negative epic 
is often related with stories about ethnic difference and constructions of majority 
and minorities are deployed to manage material and symbolic fears and confl icts 
over scarce resources and space (Ray et al.  2008 ; Fenton and Mann  2006 ; Watt 
 2006 ). 
 In a situation of longstanding and apparently overwhelming downward urban 
and social mobility caused by the end of Fordism and the inability to fi nd alternative 
social and economic organizational settings, there seems to be a higher likelihood 
of decline becoming racialized. Body-Gendrot ( 2002 ), for instance, highlights that 
in French  banlieues the clash of ethnic cultures is being exacerbated by the threat of 
downward mobility experienced by white working class families, the stigma 
attached to these areas and the decay of the physical landscape. According to the 
French author, the areas which have suffered the most are the ones locked – like 
some of our target neighbourhoods – to the Fordist system since they appear to be 
too functionally designed to be able to adapt to the economic and social changes. 
The structural changes, loss of status and downward mobility experienced by blue- 
collar workers thus nurture racist attitudes which fi nd root in the decomposition of 
the working class (Body-Gendrot  2002 ). As Lamont ( 2000 ) underlines, in this post- 
industrial society the idea of social success may appear particularly unreachable to 
the working class compared to other social classes, as their living standards are 
undergoing a process of steady decline. 
 As a matter of fact, we found confl icts between older working-class residents 
(predominantly native but sometimes with a background of internal or international 
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migration) and newly settled ethnic minorities in those former industrial neighbour-
hoods (Bermondsey, Werderau, Barriera di Milano) which are facing diffi culties in 
the transition to a new economic and social landscape and whose collective identi-
ties appear trapped in a glorious but obsolete past. Older working-class residents 
feel that both their material well-being and their identity and sense of worth are 
threatened and they fi nd it diffi cult to identify how this situation can be successfully 
overcome. 
 Whereas in most of the post-industrial neighbourhoods described in previous 
chapters, ethnic minorities are regarded by the majority as a factor of decline, in 
other investigated neighbourhoods, diversity is viewed as a positive asset. This more 
positive attitude seems to be related to the ability of neighbourhoods to cope with 
new global economic and social trends which are often associated with the increasing 
presence of ‘new middle-class multiculturals’ (Simon  2005 ), i.e. middle-class 
 professionals and cultural workers, usually with a high level of civic engagement. 3 
This is the case in Camberwell and Gostenhof where middle-class multiculturals are 
rather rooted, as well as in Poble Sec and San Paolo, traditional working-class 
neighbourhoods now shifting towards a more mixed social composition thanks to 
economic reconversion and urban renewal processes. 
 In Camberwell, gentrifi cation, like ethnic diversity, is long-established, and the 
earlier waves of gentrifi ers, most of whom belong to a multicultural middleclass 
which regards diversity as one of the appeals of the area, are committed to the 
neighbourhood. 
 In Gostenhof, during the last ten years, extensive renovation works were initiated 
in order to improve the quality of living and the image of the neighbourhood which, 
although still socially challenged, has developed a positive reputation for being a 
multicultural and ‘artistic’ area. The result is that in Gostenhof there is a cosmopoli-
tan atmosphere and, as in Camberwell, many inhabitants are actively engaged in 
voluntary work in the neighbourhood. The numerous international Delikatessen 
shops, which refl ect the diverse ethnic backgrounds of the residents, play a 
 meaningful role in the lives of Gostenhof’s residents and also attract people from 
other city areas as places to meet, interact and spend leisure time. The diverse social 
and ethnic composition is perceived as a key characteristic of the neighbourhood 
and most of the people interviewed, as well as the media, emphasized the high level 
of acceptance of, and even desire for, diversity. 
 A similar process seems to be occurring in Poble Sec which has been undergoing 
a process of change during recent years which has seen a few streets become an 
important location in the city’s ‘bohemian’ leisure and nightlife scene. Although it 
is mainly a working-class neighbourhood with lower than average real estate prices, 
during the last decade Poble Sec has also attracted some young middle class 
 residents and the neighbourhood’s increasing – and increasingly appreciated – 
diversity is also the product of this process. Similarly, in San Paolo, another of our 
investigated neighbourhoods where diversity is generally valued, in the 1990s work 
3  In fact, there is evidence that people in higher socio-cultural positions are more likely to take part 
in civic associations (Li et al.  2003 ). 
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started on tearing down abandoned industrial buildings and converting them into 
residential units, commercial outfi ts (shopping malls), public services and infra-
structures, and cultural sites. Furthermore, in contrast to Barriera di Milano – where 
post- industrial urban regeneration is just beginning and the socio-economic impact 
of de-industrialization has become heavier and heavier over the last two decades – 
the socio-economic profi le of San Paolo-Cenisia is not particularly worrying and, in 
some respects, even better than the city average (due, for instance, to higher than 
average education levels), thereby confi rming its capacity to move beyond Fordism. 
 To sum up,  the likelihood of confl ict development along ethnic lines seems to 
depend more on patterns of socio-economic mobility, whether improving or declin-
ing, of the long-established majority than on their socio-economic status per se and, 
when specifi cally referring to post-industrial neighbourhoods, on their overall 
ability to reinvent and emancipate themselves from the rigidities of the Fordist 
economic and social model. 
2.3  Places as ‘Connecting Opportunities’: Is Integration 
Transferable? 
 Places can be conceived, beyond stakes, as ‘connecting opportunities’ which offer 
the chance to meet and know the ‘Other’. As we have maintained, they are not just 
containers: they are embedded with identities and rules which shape the encounters 
and relations occurring within them and, conversely, are themselves shaped by these 
relations. 
 In the investigated neighbourhoods, we found that the lack of ‘connecting 
opportunities’ (e.g. meeting places, venues for organized activities, etc.) tended to 
generate a fragmented social fabric and less cooperative inter-group relations. We 
must, however, consider that the viability of connecting places is not simply a  matter 
of how many such places are in a given neighbourhood. Certainly, neighbourhoods 
such as Barriera di Milano, Werderau, Kőbánya and Sagrada Família have few 
 public gardens, squares, centres and associations compared to the other target 
neighbourhoods. Despite this scarcity, the available areas, such as public greens in 
Kőbánya or Sempione Park in Barriera, are neglected since they are not properly 
equipped and are regarded as unsafe. In contrast, the well-equipped  Tres Xemeneies 
park which borders Poble Sec and Ruffi ni Park which borders San Paolo are used 
intensively by residents and compensate for the lack of large green areas within 
these two neighbourhoods.  It is therefore evident that meeting places, being socially 
produced, cannot be measured only in terms of square metres but also of concrete 
use and experience . 
 Furthermore, the symbolic values of places make them arenas where moral order 
is displayed and boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ are constantly in the making. 
In this regard, Ray, Hudson and Phillips ( 2008 ) point out how racialized narratives 
of neighbourhood decline may be expressed through the affi rmation of the moral 
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superiority of ‘we’ who care and keep the environment clean and ‘they’ who do not. 
Similarly, Wimmer ( 2004 ) highlights that the use of places often refl ects or is 
employed for exemplifying a sort of moral order. According to him, the discourse of 
order does not represent a hidden way of excluding groups on an ethnic basis, but 
rather, a pure logic of boundary-making. As a matter of fact, in the Swiss neighbour-
hoods that Wimmer investigated, exclusionary sentiments and discourses were not 
directed towards immigrants per se but towards outsiders seen as undermining the 
established social and cultural order. In that case, immigrant residents were regarded 
as belonging to the ‘us’ or not depending on whether they were seen as complying 
with the rule of order and keeping common and public places tidy. Therefore, anti- 
migrant attitudes may be nourished by the feeling of loss of social order often 
refl ected in migrants’ use of places according to different and unfamiliar rules. 
 In this regard, an episode that happened in San Paolo is particularly enlightening. 
Here, groups of Peruvians used the volleyball fi eld of the SPA gardens until late at 
night listening to music and speaking loudly, raising complaints from people living 
nearby. Then meetings aimed at defusing the tensions were organized with the sup-
port of the District administration. Surprisingly, the more infl exible positions were 
held by long-established Peruvians residents who – as they themselves admitted – 
were in favour of the implementation of strict rules whereas native residents were 
more open to negotiation and compromise. The confl ict was fi nally solved thanks 
not just to rules being agreed for the use of this place, but also to a light re-planning 
which made it possible to move the fi elds farther from the apartment buildings. This 
episode confi rms Wimmer’s view that confl ict does not necessarily express latent 
racist attitudes but may actually just be about accepting the established local order. 
 A specifi c lesson from our case studies in the city chapters is that the connecting 
potential of public places also depends on  rules of use , the absence or ineffective-
ness of which can generate confl icts quickly turning into ‘moral clashes’ along eth-
nic lines. From our fi eldwork, we can derive some hypotheses on how to improve 
the effectiveness of site-specifi c sets of rules. In the fi rst place, these rules can be 
partially embedded in spaces. Indeed, sometimes the very setting of the place sug-
gests the ways in which it should be used thereby limiting negotiation and prevent-
ing confl icts; in other cases, places are very open to different uses and the agreement 
on them is completely delegated to users who could be unable to fi nd a satisfying 
arrangement. If the fi rst option tends to limit confl icts, overly neat distinctions 
between areas designed for specifi c purposes can also limit contacts. For instance, 
in the SPA gardens in San Paolo or the Tres Xemenies Park in Poble Sec specialized 
areas (a skateboarding area and basket or football fi elds for adolescents,  playgrounds 
for children, benches for elderly people, etc.) certainly prevent confl icts but also 
seem to prevent meaningful interactions since each group uses a specifi c area 
without contacts with others. 
 This sort of space planning conducive to inter-group encounters should not, how-
ever, be seen as something mechanical or deterministic and it can also be the object 
of negotiation, as in the case of SPA gardens in San Paolo mentioned above. 
 The second element which can help to identify common rules of use for places is 
formal or informal mediation facilitated by organized actors such as associations, 
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open market organizations, housing associations, etc. In fact, several authors who 
have investigated interactions in urban places have underlined the crucial impor-
tance of the intermediation of third parties (Amin  2010 ,  2012 ; Wood and Landry 
 2007 ; Sandercock  2003 ). For instance, in our case studies from the investigated 
London estates, tenants’ and residents’ associations (TRAs) – elected bodies that 
manage social activities on estates and dialogue with service providers – seem to 
soften potential confl icts among residents. In Montanaro Gardens in Barriera di 
Milano, confl icts are often solved thanks to a social cooperative that employs 
mentally ill persons in tasks such as gardening, cleaning the park and organizing 
children’s activities. Mothers, both native and foreign, entrust them to oversee their 
children while they play and elderly persons turn to this group for help when 
problems arise over park use. The neutral position of this group, being anomalous 
and eccentric with regard to established social order, makes it a very useful tool for 
confl ict resolution. 
 The relevance of both rules of use and mediating action is also evident in the case 
of Langwasser where the opening of an Intercultural Garden raised fears and 
protests among the resident population. In that case, the mediating role of the 
Municipality was generally very important in overcoming the confl ict, but in practi-
cal terms the key development was the capacity of the locally established Intercultural 
Garden committee to counter anxieties and concerns by developing a set of rules to 
regulate opening hours, hygiene and garbage, parking and all other practical issues 
that could potentially generate disturbance for the neighbours. It is worth underlin-
ing that this brokerage role can be assumed formally in the organization’s mission, 
as in Langwasser, or informally, as in the other cases described above. 
 Infl ows of neighbourhood users attracted by leisure opportunities or touristic 
sites have an ambivalent effect as they may either foster or hamper the use of public 
places as connecting opportunities by residents. In Sagrada Família public places 
and facilities are perceived as being totally overwhelmed by tourists. Most shops 
and bars cater to them rather than to residents who as a result have few places to 
meet. According to some residents, the fl ea market in Encants Vells (at the border of 
Sagrada Família), also attracts a lot of outsiders and is therefore not used as a meeting 
area by neighbours. Also in Józsefváros, a centrally-located neighbourhood and one 
of the most congested districts of Budapest, the crowds of tourists seem to hamper 
contacts and relations among residents despite the existence of a multitude of 
meeting places. 
 On the contrary, in the inner neighbourhood of Gostenhof the high population 
density and the increasing number of shops and restaurants are perceived by 
interviewees to have fostered a trend away from mutual ignorance towards greater 
harmony and cooperation among residents: the everyday interactions involved in 
activities such as shopping, leisure time pursuits, courtyard festivals as well as 
participation in associations, the local district committee, and neighbourhood 
 centres are considered crucial in fostering encounters between migrants and natives. 
Similarly, in Camberwell the high density of restaurants, cafés and shops is pre-
dominantly perceived as an asset for inter-group relations. To take one last example, 
in Poble Sec the transformation of Blai Street into a pedestrian street and other 
F. Pastore and I. Ponzo
191
urban transformations have attracted people from outside the neighbourhood 
thereby increasing, according to the residents, positive interactions across cultural, 
social and origin cleavages. 
 Finally, in all investigated neighbourhoods,  cooperation is generally easier in 
what Wood and Landry ( 2007 )  call ‘zones of encounter’ and Amin ( 2002 )  defi nes 
‘micropublic’ , where deeper and more enduring interactions between people 
 engaging in shared activities and common goals can take place. Such places are, for 
instance, associations, schools, youth centres, sport clubs, etc. This is exemplifi ed in 
the case of ‘Laboratorio Territoriale’, managed by the municipal administration in 
San Paolo, which houses the internet point together with the headquarters of several 
native and migrant associations. Here the social and cultural heterogeneity of the 
users is not a cause of confl ict, but rather, a starting point for positive and even 
cooperative interactions. The Public Baths of Aglié Street in Barriera di Milano 
work in a similar way: here friendly relations and cooperation clearly prevail over 
confl ict. The Sagrada Família multi-purpose centre where a library, civic centre, 
local marketplace, social services, and organizations’ premises are located and 
where activities (e.g. Chinese New Year’s celebrations) and courses are organized, 
generates opportunities of encounter between immigrants and natives that allow 
positive everyday interactions, albeit often superfi cial. In Langwasser, the 
Intercultural Gardens – which are gardens with no fences between neighbours in 
order to facilitate encounters and foster mutual tolerance and respect – bring together 
migrants of different origins and natives through the shared activity of gardening. 
These kinds of examples are actually rather numerous and cannot be listed in full 
here (for further examples see the Concordia Discors project’s city reports on  www.
concordiadiscors.eu ). 
 The potential of these places to facilitate positive interactions is hard to deny. 
These are places where rules about the use of the space are usually clear and often 
codifi ed, and where collective actors with explicit or implicit mediating functions 
are present: two factors that, as outlined above, facilitate positive group interactions. 
Furthermore, these places are usually selective, i.e. users go there with specifi c 
purposes and sometimes share similar lifestyles and even values, all of which also 
makes the development of contacts and positive inter-group relations easier. 
 What is less obvious is that  the integration (essentially understood here as peace-
ful and even cooperative interethnic coexistence) achieved in these places is not 
completely transferable to the rest of the neighbourhood . Often the same groups 
develop different relations in different places. They may cooperate in schools, 
ignore each other in public gardens, and maybe even fi ght in apartment buildings. 
For instance, in Bermondsey majority and minority groups may meet and positively 
interact in the public library but ignore each other in Dickens Estates. In San Paolo, 
elderly people and migrant men may get on well together in SPA gardens and 
confront each other with apprehension in via Di Nanni at night. These examples 
illustrate that although these ‘zones of encounters’ are crucial to fostering positive 
inter-group relations, the integration produced within them will not spontaneously 
expand beyond them. In order to enhance their positive impact on neighbourhood 
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sociability, specifi c measures are needed. Otherwise, they risk becoming little 
‘pacifi c’ isles of integration, where many occasionally visit but few settle for good. 
3  Policy Community Cohesion as a Factor of Narrative 
Autonomy 
 As we explained in the Introduction, although the core of the book consists in the 
analysis of inter-group boundaries and relations in everyday life, we have also 
analyzed the macro-frames within which everyday relations and narratives are 
developed, with special attention to neighbourhood policy communities and local 
media, as well as the relation between these two actors. As illustrated across the 
city- centred chapters, neighbourhood policy communities – meaning all actors 
involved in local policymaking regardless of their legal status, i.e. public, no-profi t 
and profi t actors (Jordan  1990 ; Rhodes  1990 ; Marsh and Rhodes  1992 ) – play a role 
in shaping local ‘imagined communities’ 4 by contributing to the production of 
‘ cultural repertoires’ that defi ne what makes one part of the local community (Lamont 
 2000 ). Such cultural toolkits help shape the notions of citizenship and identity that 
determine which perceptions of relations between immigrants and majority are 
considered sensible, realistic and legitimate, and which collective  identities and 
demands are more likely to gain legitimacy in public discourse (Koopmans et al. 
 2005 ). In other words, policy communities hold what Bourdieu ( 1985 ) defi nes as 
symbolic capital, i.e. ‘autonomy of the fi eld of symbolic production’ (p. 731). 
Indeed, he writes, ‘politics is the site par excellence of symbolic effi cacy, the action 
that is performed through signs capable of producing social things and, in particular, 
groups’ (p. 741), it is the site arena where the power of narrative, of conserving or 
transforming the categories through which the world is perceived is displayed. 
 As Andrea Pogliano points out in the chapter on media, this symbolic power 
seems to be greater in neighbourhoods with more cohesive policy communities. 
Here we mean cohesion both in terms of the degree of consistency among different 
actors’ representations and of the operational coordination among them. This is a 
very important point that we would like to develop further here. Our comparative 
inquiry suggests that, throughout very different urban contexts, more cohesive local 
policy communities appear more resilient to the exogenous infl uences of city-level 
or national media and/or political movements and better able to produce self- 
representations of the local community. Given that exogenous narratives are often 
broadly critical towards migration, such narrative autonomy is often synonymous 
with community resilience towards xenophobic thinking and practices. 
 To give a concrete example, we can point at the prevalent ‘stories about the 
neighbourhood’ of San Paolo-Cenisia proliferating in local media which are very 
4  ‘Imagined community’ (Anderson  1991 ) can be meant as symbolic communities whose members 
share categorisation systems to differentiate insiders and outsiders and common vocabularies 
through which they create common identities (Gusfi eld  1975 ). 
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different from those in Barriera di Milano. The former are strongly permeated with 
references to the neighbourhood’s history of anti-fascist insurgency and workers’ 
struggles. The neighbourhood is still systematically described as a working-class 
district, characterized by a strong solidarity towards immigrants from other Italian 
regions in 1950s–1960s and from abroad nowadays. It is worth also noting that in 
this case the sources more frequently used by journalists to write about the neigh-
bourhood are usually the neighbourhood’s stakeholders (District councillors, NGOs, 
service providers, etc), i.e. actors who belong to the local policy community. On the 
other hand, in the case of Barriera di Milano, a collection of brief comments from 
bystanders – who describe the neighbourhood as a ‘problem area’, ‘robbery district’, 
‘neighbourhood with many illegal immigrants’, ‘unsafe place’, and ‘slum’ – is often 
the journalistic solution to the scarcity of strong and consistent local voices. Our 
hypothesis to make sense of such striking difference is that in San Paolo-Cenisia the 
presence of strong stakeholders and a well-organized policy community helps to 
give voice to the neighbourhood and to generate and channel positive narratives 
about inter-group relations. As Simon ( 2000 ) argues in his analysis of Belleville, a 
highly diverse Paris neighbourhood, the working-class past of the neighbourhood 
and the longstanding immigrant presence are historical facts but they probably had 
neither the impact nor the importance which is now attributed to them in narratives 
of the neighbourhood. So in the case of Belleville narratives are also of great impor-
tance in shaping today’s inter-group relations: by associating them with the neigh-
bourhood’s collective memory, immigrants cease to be unfamiliar and potentially 
threatening outsiders. 
 In the same way, the more positive framing of policy interventions in Poble Sec 
can be seen as the result of a very rich network of associations fostering a dynamic 
civic and social life. In promoting such strong neighbourhood activism an important 
role has been played by the  Pla de Desenvolupament Comunitari del Poble Sec 
(Communitarian Development Plan), a project created in 2005 and led by the 
 Coordinadora d’Entitats del Poble Sec (Coordination of the neighbourhood’s 
associations) with the support of the  Taula de Convivència del Poble Sec (Table for 
Peaceful Coexistence in Poble Sec) set up by the local administration. In contrast, 
in Sagrada Família there are many associations, but just a few residents participate 
in their activities so they are not as strong as in Poble Sec. 
 Elaborating further on what is implicit in Pogliano’s analysis, in Werderau the 
mobilization of confl ict is mirrored in the intensifi cation of media coverage. Looking 
at the distribution of articles dealing with migrants over time, it is remarkable that 
there was a sudden rise of such articles in 2002, corresponding with a wave of moral 
panic, followed by a rapid fall: in the next year only three out of 13 articles explicitly 
touched upon the issue. This development seems to be a result both of the broader 
political change in the City of Nuremberg and of the appointment in Werderau of a 
district coordinator who mobilized the local policy community and put pressure on 
the local media. 5 In Langwasser this infl uence was even more explicit: the framing 
5  The case of Werderau demonstrates how institutional changes may have consequences for the 
structure of public discourse and vice versa (Koopmans et al.  2005 ). 
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of the confl ict over the Intercultural Gardens as a migrant minority-majority confl ict 
had strongly emotionalized and politicized the debate and had drawn more people 
into it. In this situation the district coordinator appealed to the media not to give the 
anti-immigrant groups publicity and support for their propaganda. The media 
therefore became increasingly critical of the right-wing campaign and covered the 
project more favourably. 
 The cases of Werderau and Langwasser clearly show also how a cohesive local 
policy community can reject anti-immigrant political campaigns organized by 
external actors. In Werderau, the ethnicization of the confl ict was indeed partly 
stimulated by the nativist, right-wing forces of the neo-Nazi party NPD and 
‘Ausländerstopp’, a regional group coming from outside, which in both municipal 
and federal elections obtained better electoral results in Werderau than elsewhere in 
the city. In Langwasser fears about the Intercultural Gardens were also reinforced 
by the anti-immigrant agitation of right-wing groups. After the intervention of the 
City-appointed community workers and a change of perspective in the media, the 
opposition campaigns slowly weakened. 
 Similar although less evident dynamics were registered in Bermondsey. Events 
to celebrate St. George’s Day have been staged in different parts of northern 
Southwark since 2006. The celebrations have, particularly in South Bermondsey, 
been framed as part of an effort to ‘reclaim’ St George (whose cross is on the 
English fl ag) from the anti-immigrant British National Party and the National Front, 
both of which had used the area around The Blue to stage marches. 6 By mobilizing 
and networking the neighbourhood civil society organizations and schools, it 
appears that Southwark Borough has been successful in re-claiming St. George’s 
Day as this is now a community celebration rather than a stage for BNP demonstra-
tions. This saint’s day now brings together the local community around the celebra-
tion of the English fl ag meant as the symbol of a mixed British society rather than a 
white-only one. 
 The British and, especially, the German cases are particularly revealing about the 
role of what Brubaker ( 2002 ,  2006 ) calls ‘ethno-political entrepreneurs’. The 
American author points out how dramatic events can crystallize a potential group so 
that undertaking a strategy of provocation, often by a very small number of persons, 
can sometimes be an effective strategy of group-making. 7 In this case, the protagonists 
of ethnic confl icts are not ethnic groups as such but various kinds of organizations 
including institutions, political parties, associations and movements, and mass 
media, all of which compete for the right to represent the same (putative) 
group. Furthermore, these dynamics highlight that claim-making and confl icts are 
6  See the following thread with views from local residents concerning the BNP and different 
experiences of racism and multiculture in Bermondsey:  http://www.london-se1.co.uk/forum/
read/1/61972 (accessed 18.04.2012). 
7  Confl ict can then be both the cause and the consequence of a high level of ‘groupness’ (Brubaker 
 2002 ,  2006 ) 
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 interactive processes, confi rming once again that ethnic confl ict is often far from 
being rooted in actual cultural differences 8 (Koopmans et al.  2005 ). 
 This does not mean that the confl ict does not exist but, as the German cases 
clearly show, it may assume the form of ‘meta-confl ict’ or ‘confl ict over the nature 
of confl ict’ (Horowitz  1991 ), a struggle over the framing and narrative used to label 
and explain the confl ict. As we said at the beginning of this section, the symbolic 
capital held by neighbourhood policy communities gives them a role in this process. 
We can thus conclude that  the ability of any given local policy community to 
construct its own narrative is crucial to making a neighbourhood resilient against 
disruptive external narratives and thus to building a more cohesive local society . 
4  A Wider Look: Integration as a Threatened Local 
Public Good 
 After more than half a decade since its outburst, all indicators show us that the 
 current economic crisis is burdening and weakening the social fabric of European 
cities, albeit not in an even way. Even if there are signifi cant local variations, the 
recession is everywhere eroding the primary economic and political foundations of 
integration, namely, a suffi cient degree of labour market inclusion of immigrant 
workers and a sustainable (or perceived as such by the autochthonous majority) 
level of welfare consumption by those workers and their families. At the same time, 
spontaneous shock-absorbing mechanisms – among which one could include 
migrant returns and secondary migration to other, more promising, destinations – 
are operating only to a limited, though hard to measure, extent. 
 In this context, the public budget crisis is dramatically reducing (although here 
too in a very asymmetrical way across Europe) the states’ capacity to address gaps 
in integration through targeted policy programmes and measures. Local authorities 
are increasingly being left alone to face the social consequences of the crisis and, in 
particular, its impact on the integration between foreign immigrants and the receiv-
ing society. But local authorities are themselves in deep fi nancial diffi culties, and 
integration policies are often the fi rst casualty of spending reviews and cuts. This is 
especially true in southern Europe, where the transfer of fi nances from central states 
and regions to municipal authorities is being subjected to particularly heavy budget 
cuts. 
 In such a bleak overall context, one could hypothesize that immediate repercus-
sions would be felt at the local level, including on social ties and inter-group 
8  Wimmer reminds us that group closure (‘groupness’) and clarity of boundaries (‘boundedness’) 
may vary in degree from one social situation or institutional context to another. Therefore, the 
stability of boundaries may vary and some ethnic boundaries are more resistant to strategic reinter-
pretation than others: thick identities reduce the range of strategic options that actors have at their 
disposal, while where boundaries are not salient, classifi cation ambiguity and complexity is high 
and boundary shift for strategic purpose is easier (Wimmer  2008 ). 
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 dynamics at the neighbourhood and street level. As in other historical periods 
marked by trends of societal impoverishment and growing inequality, one could 
hypothesize that neighbourhood communities would emerge as the fi rst level where 
gaps in integration manifest themselves, generating tensions which are easily 
framed as interethnic. One could expect, and fear, that, due, among other factors, to 
the apparently harshening socio-economic stratifi cation of housing markets, such 
ethnically framed neighbourhood confl icts would increasingly resemble ‘wars 
among poors’. 
 Such hypotheses and expectations are certainly legitimate in the current European 
circumstances. And they indeed stood prominently among the initial empirical 
research questions for the comparative project presented in this book. At the end of 
our fi eldwork, though, we have to revise these initial hypotheses, at least in part. 
Worries and complaints about the impact of the crisis were, of course, voiced in our 
research fi elds, for instance by local policymakers or bureaucrats having to cope 
with budget reductions, but in a less pervasive and insistent way than we expected. 
Above all, in none of our target neighbourhoods did crisis-related anxiety seem to 
crystallize into explicit and widespread immigrant and/or minority scapegoating 
capable of providing cheap combustible for interethnic confl ict. 
 Given the overall, highly uneven European geography of the impact of the crisis, 
such apparent lack of clearly crisis-related interethnic tensions is particularly 
 striking in the case of Barcelona. This unexpected negative fi nding is consistent, 
however, with available broader evidence on the impact of the crisis on immigrant 
integration and native-immigrant relations in crisis-stricken Spain. As a matter of 
fact, several researchers have pointed out, often with a mix of surprise and relief, the 
lack of xenophobic reactions even in the context of the ever harsher competition in 
the lower layers of the Spanish labour market (Arango  2013 ; Rinken and Velasco 
Dujo  2010 ; Rinken  2011 ). How to explain such a puzzling and mildly reassuring 
outcome? Based on the evidence presented in the chapter on Barcelona, a few 
hypotheses can be formulated. One could, perhaps, argue that we were lucky, or 
maybe biased, in the selection of the target cities and neighbourhoods: if fi eldwork 
had been carried out, for instance, in a city like Athens, a worsening in inter-group 
relations associated with the crisis would almost certainly have emerged. But, in the 
meantime, one has to acknowledge that some of the researched neighbourhoods – in 
Turin, Barcelona or Budapest, to mention only the most evident cases – are far from 
immune to the negative impacts of the crisis on prosperity, equality and security. So, 
we have to consider other possible explanations for the relatively reassuring lack of 
spectacular fi ndings in terms of crisis-related interethnic confl ict. 
 A possible factor could have to do with timing and, more specifi cally, with the 
length of time that is generally needed before fi nancial and macroeconomic down-
turns produce occupational and social repercussions, and then before these trigger 
the processes of social construction of ethnic confl ict that have been analytically 
described by Claudia Köhler in her chapter. 
 The time factor is certainly infl uential, and the landscape of inter-group relations 
might indeed look worse if we return to our research fi elds in 1 or 2 years, especially 
if glimmers of economic recovery remain so few and so weak. But we cannot rule 
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out another, less pessimistic, explanation for the relatively peaceful outlook that was 
revealed by our case studies: that there is a sort of intrinsic resilience within 
neighbourhood societies facing potentially disrupting pressures. As delineated in 
the previous paragraph, we understand the capacity of local policy communities to 
maintain control over the image of their neighbourhood in the media and in the 
broader public sphere, and to resist and counter potentially harmful exogenous nar-
ratives, to be a key attribute and an important corollary of community cohesion. 
 In presenting the results of research which was also supported by the Integration 
Fund of the European Union, we believe it is appropriate to conclude by trying to 
draw some additional conclusions with specifi c regard to the concept of integration 
from the arguments above. Research carried out in rapidly evolving, sometimes 
unquestionably fragile but nevertheless resilient neighbourhoods, suggests to us 
that, in contemporary European cities, the integration of immigrants (especially in 
its relational dimension, which primarily consists of the absence of grassroots  ethnic 
confl ict) can fruitfully be conceived as a  local public good . A ‘public good’ because 
integration, if rigorously understood as a two-way process, can indeed be argued to 
be a  non-excludable and  non-rivalrous good (i.e. the two key requisites according to 
the standard micro-economic defi nition of public goods). But it is also a ‘ local 
good’, in the sense that successful integration in today's immigration neighbour-
hoods can hardly be achieved without a strong, diffuse and proactive engagement of 
local communities themselves. 
 If integration had ever been something which could be imported (which is highly 
questionable), produced at national level and locally distributed from above, this is 
not the case anymore. In US society, where the degree of collective reliance on the 
role of the state as an ‘integration/cohesion provider’ is historically lower than in 
Europe, the importance of grassroots community building (and more recently ‘com-
munity organizing’, as a distinct and more politically aware form of mobilization) 
for societal cohesion is traditionally greater and better understood. The comparative 
research carried out in European neighbourhoods that we have presented in this 
book suggests to us that it is time for Europe to learn from that tradition, avoiding, 
however, any naïve illusion of a quick and easy socio-cultural transplant. Indeed, we 
must be aware that European societies are deeply different from North American 
ones and we cannot expect a sudden change in attitudes, ideas and values built and 
consolidated over centuries. Furthermore, community activism requires structural 
conditions starting from what we called ‘interaction sites’ where cross-cultural 
groups have the chance to form and strengthen themselves. But it is precisely these 
interaction sites – such as public libraries, public parks, NGOs’ premises, and other 
similar places of potential encounter – that are now at particularly high risk of 
 disappearance, due to the sharp retreat of public actors. 
 Cautious voices, warning, for instance, that deprived, and sometimes confl icted, 
neighbourhoods might not be conducive to community involvement and partnership 
(Salmon  2002 ), should not be ignored. Nevertheless, we still believe that without a 
more direct, intensive and continuous engagement of local communities, with 
neighbourhoods as a pivotal level for both analysis and mobilization, integration is 
probably destined to become an ever more elusive reality. 
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